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Coming up with a visionary document  in and about the European Union anybody runs 
the risk of being  pushed to the corner by all sides. Some will call him idealist, other will 
call it empty talk, yet anothers will miss sectoral or group specific targets, still anothers 
will call any number - besdies page numbers - as arbitrary, academically unsound and  
void of  implementation capacity. This has already been the case with the Europe 2020 
document of the Commission published in late February 20102 and to be finalized by the 
June Council of the EU. Usual criticisms and counter-criticisms have already been 
voiced, and  anybody studying e.g the information website euractiv.com  can get a broad 
coverage in all official EU languages on the borderless debate. 
 
This author, having observed the ups and downs of European integration for decades, 
tries to avoid both over- and underestimation of any joint policy document. For one, the 
Community has always been  moving ahead in an incrementalist-gradualist manner, 
relying on a lerge degree of  pragmatism, common sense and compromise politics. For 
this reason the EU has constanlty been lagging behind its own objectives and ideals, 
which is a feature of normelcy. On the other hand, quite unlike many other integrational 
groupings, the EU has indeed been quite successful in  climbing up on the ladder of 
various layers of integration. While some  of its competitors, like the eastern trade bloc 
Comecon collapsed, others, like ASEAN stagnate at limited trade policy liberalization, 
the EU has been singularly successful in  deepening its  dimensions of integration, from 
free trade in industrial gooods and a bit of joint support for agriculture towards a political 
union. The latter is  certainly fragmentary, but the evolution to this direction is 
undoubted. The Lisbon Treaty, the EMU, the European Court of Justice and  an ever 
larger number of common policies and cooperation fora all reflect the irreversibility of 
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the process of Europeanization in a variety of areas, from the political to social, economic 
and  cultural alike. And for anyone moving it is just as well to have a point of orientation, 
a set of ideas to draft the possible trajectories for the future. 
 
On the Used and Misuses of Strategies     
 
Europe 2020 is an immdediate follow-up to the Lisbon  Agenda, a   similarly broadish 
strategy document adopted at the turn of the millennium. Without  reiterating the  bits and 
pieces/Rodrigues, ed,2009/ let us recall that the  strategy was never meant to be an 
operational policy document. Both in its original and in its revised 2005 version it was an 
attempt to bridge the gap between considerations of global business competitiveness and 
broader social and environmental  concerns, that have been manifestly  gathering 
momentum in the set of preferences of the European electorate, as reflected in the annual 
Eurobarometer surveys/that are conducted in a standardized methodology across the EU/. 
For this reason it would be hard to subscribe to the frequent claims by policy-makers and  
journalists who consider  the Agenda as a mere talk shop. If for no other reason, because 
of  practical exigencies even firms, but also ministries, universities or regulatory agencies 
tend to have formal mission statements, describing  their raison d’étre. While it is well 
taken, that  there is no agreement in the EU about  finalité politique,  especially the series 
of unsuccessful referenda on the  Reform Treaty has indicated: most of the electorate 
does not have a clear idea of what the EU is all about, why the institutions, procedures 
and the partial relegation of sovereignty to joint bodies. 
 
It is to a large degree reassuring to observe that  the Union comes out with a new strategy 
immediately upon the  aftermath of a global financial crisis. The latter has  had  major 
repercussions on the global economy/Stiglitz,2009/ and has modified to a considerable 
degree the  modus operandi  of the European economic policies at the national and  
Community levels alike/Csaba,2009/. As can be  seen from the cited and a number of 
other sources,  those interventions- similarly to that of the  non-interventionism  of the 
preceding decade- has not followed any systematic economic logic, be that academic or 
practical. It followed to a large degree improvisations and  panic reactions to the crisis,  
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without any preliminary calculation of costs and  limits, let alone elaborating strategies 
for withdrawal. Under this angle day do day improvisations often translate into policy 
lines, which as they are not  really intended by anybody, nor are they condoned or 
accepted as  sustainable. 
 
In such a situation it is necessary, altough clearly insufficient to  elaborate  what the ECB 
and others recently term as an exit strategy, whic in nomrmative terms surely covers 
more than  copying with immediate challenges like the  Greek debt, and should ensure a 
return to rules-based  fiscal policy. Recent evidence surveying theories and two centuries 
of empirical statistics/Reinhart-Rogoff, 2009/ indicate that public debt, especially if it 
grows exponentially, is not an innocent monetary phenomenon as  subsumed by much of 
the mainstream modelling, new classical and new Keynesian alike. In reality  debt, and 
by implication, deficits, are always and everywhere a threat. Thus, while allowing for the 
more flexible interpretation of the deficit criterion, the debt stock and especially its 
medium run evolution remains a major indicator of economic health of nations in the 
long run/Blanchard,2010/.  
 
From  the above considerations it follows, that returning to sound public finances is a 
must already in the medium run. The financial turmoil at the time of completing this 
piece indicates, once again, that global private markets are unlikely to finance just any 
size/dynamics of public debts, thus public authorieties need to beware. However, 
experiences of the 1990s indiccate, that this is not the whole story. Similarly to that 
decade unemployment may be a lasting bedfellow of recovery, even if fiscal policies are 
sound. Jobless growth, which is a cyclical phenomenon in the USA, can indeed return to 
much of continetal Europe, old and new. Therefore  the calls for broader policy 
objectives, that go beyond common sense solid economic practices are indeed topical and 
well established.  
 
By the same token it is a welcome development that the Europe 2020 strategy strengthens 
the idea of surveillance over the behavior of the member states. However, it is important 
to make some  reservations. 
 4
 
a/ The surveillance issue comes up at a time when decision-makers are not very deeply 
concerned by the long range issues we  analyze, but are under the panic reaction of 
markets on Greek debt crisis and default threat3. For this reason their enthusiasm and 
committment is less then credible, especially for sunnier days. 
 
b/ Non-compliance has not started with Greece, nor by the eastward enlargement of the 
EU. The credibility loophole, that originates with the exemption of France and Germany 
from the stipulations of the Stability and Growth pact are yet to be remedied, by 
procedural and substantive action. 
 
c/ Reporting, especially on public finance, was thought to have been  thoroughly covered 
by Eurostat and  Ecofin reporting and controlling practices. The repeated and recurring  
mishaps in Greece indicate that the system in reality works much less efficiently, than it 
looks on paper and is  sold in textbooks and official communication. 
 
d/ A number of suggestions were made, already in the context of the Stability and Growth 
Pact revision of 2005, to enhance the technocratic nature of surveillance, enhance the 
credibility and reliability of  basic underlying data, and cross check forecasts qhich often  
serve immediate political purposes. Most of those suggestions, in theoretical and practical 
terms, are still valid.                                                                                   
 
However, as could be shown then/Csaba,2007,chapter8/  it was not lack of cognitive 
power, but insufficient political will to countervail and limit immediate politickling and 
interference by governments in the procedures,  that curtailed those propositions from 
implementation. Even if we think of simple  procedural options, such as outsourcing 
some of the data or decision to independent bodies, as European Court of Auditors or 
even Eurostat, resistance is likely to mount. No improvement is realistic without those  
changes though.   
                                                 
3 EU ministers agree to 750 be euro package to save currency.BBC World News, 10 May,2010/downloaded 
the same day. 
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Jobs and Growth: Are They Alternatives? 
 
It  was one of the contestable pieces of the Lisbon Agenda that it put, in its original 
versions, growth ahead of jobs. Reflecting the general thinking and social mood of the 
period it has  put, at the end of the day, the cart before the horse. For this reason the 2005 
revision was a step in the right direction. However, in the contemporary debate many 
authors, and not only from the green camp, consider that  growth is no longer an option, 
or at least should not be a priority. Greening the economy and creating jobs is on the 
agenda. 
 
At times of soaring unemployment it goes without saying that  growth is the only way to 
create jobs in a sustainable manner. Recurring attempts by the Frech and other 
governments to limit working hours and redistribute jobs proved to be a dead end, since 
neither the number nor the  distribution of jobs is a given that only needs to be calculated. 
In reality none of the two can be calculated ex ante,  as they evolve as an interplay of a 
number of factors, including ones usually outside the scope of  conventional economic 
analysis, such  as societal values,  quality of education, health conditions  and quality of 
the regulatory environment as well as long run perspectives of lifestyles by  masses of 
individuals. Especially perceptional issues seem to rank high on this agenda. 
 
For this reason the task to enhance  the labor market participation rate from 69 to 75 per 
cent by the end of the decade is ambitious indeed. But anybody having worked on 
pensions would immediately recall: this is a must to  address the multiple  challenges of  
an ageing society/Botos,2008/.    
 
There are two basic ways one may approach this goal. First, if we look at the formal  
level, the Community has little if any immediate competences over labor markets. 
Regulation of those as well as the educational systems and  most of the social transfers 
also remain firmly in the hand of  national authorities. In turn, not only in legal terms, but 
also in terms of factors forming supply and demand,  national arrangements dominate the 
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integrational ones.  EU level talk on those therefore remains  at most at the level of 
declaration of goodwill.  
 
In a more complex approach we take it for granted that  the process of Europeanization is 
more subtle and interactive than the formalistic-legalistic top-down approaches would 
have it. The EU has in its long history, often  seen the bottom-up evolution of policies in 
a number of areas, from energy to the environment. Those reflect changes in perceptions 
and  priorities of the electorate, which in turn is a fully legitimate way of elaborating new 
and new areas of cooperation. Under this second angle social Europe implies an ever 
closer intertwining of markets in general and labor markets in particular. In so doing it is 
rather straightforward to  expect a fair degree of imitation and spontaneous adaptation, 
learning by doing and thereby a degree of convergence in the areas which look to be 
entirely in the hands of national regulators4. The rulings of the European Court of Justice 
as well as the broad pan-European  discourse over  lifestyles, over work-family balance, 
gender issues and the like inevitably shape the  arrangements, first in indirect and later in 
a more immediate manner. The more pressing we consider the  fiscal burden of welfare  
arrangements, that enjoy a  very high approval rate across EU states, the more inevitable 
it becomes to induce an ever larger part of our fellow citizens to be engaged in much 
longer working lives than  it was  percieved normal say two decades ago. Also in terms of 
social integration and  in curbing health expenditures lengthening active lives was shown 
by countless analyses to be the way  ahead of humnane and sustainable solutions5.   
 
Since liberalization of labor markets is by definition a basically national job, whose 
progress  took only a snail’s pace in most continental countries, moreover that the  
employment losses triggered by the financial crises may well sustain for long time, it is  
certainly not trivial if, and to what degree, the propensity of firms to apply labor saving 
technologies can be countered. Moreover nontraditional forms of employment often 
emerge in the EU- unlike in the USA- only if active support by public authorities in the 
form of tax  reliefs, benefits or prescriptions  promote their spread. The  thick web of 
                                                 
4 For a comparative analysis cf Bruno-Rovelli/2010/. 
5 Cf the Forum discussion on flexicurity in: Interconomics, no2/2008. 
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regulations and  stagnant domestic markets  limit the growth potential of small business, 
which could be one of the major source of job creation. But  the difficulties of startups  
are well known though, but hardly remedied by the changes of the past few years. Thus 
the drift between frontrunners like Denmark and laggards like Spain is likely to sustain.   
 
It is perhaps of great imprtance for us to underscore the  fundamantal difference between 
the idea of greening growth and halting growth. While environmentalists tend  to call for 
the latter, the EU 2020 document considers sustainable development more in line with the 
traditional thinking in economics, where  the continuous expansion- and equitable 
distribution- of wealth is axiomatic. The more we believe in the relevance of  overcoming 
world poverty/Collier,2007/, exacerbated by the financial crisis, thus - with over 1.4 by 
persons living below 1 dollar per day- the less we can put up with any version of zero 
growth.                                                                 
 
Moreover, as the strategy also elaborates in some detail, growth nowadays  no longer 
equals to quantitative expansion of industry and destructiuon of the natural environment. 
On the contrary, reliance on computer-based technologies and finance, introducing 
environmentally friendly services have already developed into major industries in 
Scandinavia and elswhere. For this reason it is entirely feasible to expand wealth without 
expanding energy needs, or even diminishing those. In the case of new member states the 
reserves for the latter are particularly considerable, since a unit of GDP is still produced 
with an input of about twice as much energy as in the advanced western countries.   
 
Smart Growth Is a Must By Now         
 
  The preceding ideas have already foreshadowed the  imminent need to change the 
traditional pattern of production and consumption wit its wasteful and environmentally  
deleterious  features. The position of the EU, adopted at the Copenhagen Global  Climate 
Summit in December 2009 has already foreshadowed  that the  Community has no other 
option of avoiding its relegation to global irrelevance than acting as a pioneer in terms of 
a new, environmentally sustainable  model of economic advancement. With the eastward 
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enlargement the need for  convergence has come back to the mainstage of policy-making, 
without however  compromising its longstanding committment to environmental 
sustainability. 
 
The only way of getting both ends meet is the implementation of the new type of growth, 
based on innovation. The latter- contrary to the conventional neoclassical simplifications- 
can and should not be restrained to  technological progress. Innovations in the 
organization of work, for instance/Makó et al,2008/ can and often do, play an even more 
important role in bringing about more wealth creation and better consumer satisfaction, 
without requiring major investments, and certainly without  burdening the biosphere of 
our globe. Meeting the third headline objective of cutting greenhouse emmissions by 20 
per cent is thus both attainable and integral to the entire meaning of the new strategy. 
 
Let us be clear: the volatility of commodity, goods, food and financial markets in the 
2007-2010 period have clearly indicated, yet again, the limitation of any growth pattern 
in Europe that would be a sheer replication or a mildly modified second edition of the 
traditional factor intensive pattern. With that avenue closed,  smart growth, i.e the path 
based on innovation of organization, of social networks, as well as R+D intensive  
specialization remain the only game in town. 
 
Let us add: while the Europe 2020 headline goal of spending 3 per cent of GDP, a 
replication of the 2000 Barcelona target, is  somewhat formal and bureaucratic, it does 
contain a message  of the need to do more/and perhaps talk less/ in terms of  research and 
its application. In so doing  involvement of businesses, both in terms of funding and in 
terms of applications, has become particularly  relevant for countries where this lag is the 
biggest, namely the new member states and the southern  cone of the EU, where the 
corporate-university linkageas are perhaps the weakest.  
 
It is important for us to recall: in this area  reliance on the big EU funded mega projects 
always tended to be an exception rather than the rule. Furthermore the questionable 
economic efficiency of those, from the Ariane space project to the  limited success of the  
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framework programs in terms of any  conventional indicators of research output analysis, 
be those patents in the sciences, or the number of independent citations in the social 
sciences. This sad outcome  caution against our seeing the return of the old big push 
approach as the promise for the future. Instead the reliance of a larger number of 
nationally funded or regionally organized smaller projects, initiated locally and often by 
industry, may be the lightposts for the future ahead.   
 
Social Europe – But How? 
 
As we have seen above growth is though a necessary but not a sufficient condition  for 
generating employment and cohesion, which are known to be the basic constituents of  
the social  dimension of sustainability. The latter is by no means less relevant than the 
conventionally discussed financial and evironmental sustainability, as the recurring 
violent  racial clashes in a number of  west European cities, from Paris to Amsterdam 
have amply and recurringly demonstrated. Therefore it is legitimate for the new strategy 
to focus on  education and  poverty reduction.This is in line with the broader approaches 
in economic sciences that have gained currency over the past few years, especially in 
terms of broadening the concept of growth to development. The latter is reflected i.a in 
the move awy from GDP-based approaches to HDI and other  nonconventional 
measurements of  well-being.  
 
It is one ofthe most pertinent insights of those broader approaches that poverty can and 
should not be reduced to lack of income, as neoclassical approaches tend to have it. 
Poverty is, in line wth the classical work by Amartya Sen/1999/ is rigthly seen as lack of 
capabilities. In other words, no lasting improvement is feasible if it is based on transfers 
of various sorts. Tackling the fundamental problem of social exclusion, of  lacking 
motivation, and of missing capabilities to learn new and socially relevant capabilities, 
such as computer literacy, command of foreign languages and  obtaining social skills 
needed for  labor market performance is feasible  only if education is conceived in a 
fundamentally different way from how it used to be. Rather than following ideologically 
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set objectives the  mission of schools should be the provision of the above listed skills, 
that allow young people to be integrated in a competitive society. 
 
Under this angle it is a welcome development, that  the priority in Europe 2020 is no 
longer focusing on the best and brightest, but on the poorest performers, i.e the early 
school leavers. Four out of the seven flagship initiatives  focus on the above listed areas. 
This may in turn help create a pool of qualified persons who aim and are able for  life 
long learning, which is no longer a mere slogan in the contemporary society. The target 
of poverty reduction by 25 per cent is intimately related to the former, insofar as missing 
skills count as one of the major reasons for  notorious lack of competitiveness. 
 
Let us add: contrary to frequent calls from industrialists, economics of education does not 
support  the exclusive focus on vocational training of teenagers, or  on science education 
in the college and university levels. Perhaps the most important lacking skills of the  
marginal groups are perceptional and  social in nature, in terms of cooperation, ability 
and willingness to tolerate  a value system and discipline required by large scale 
organizations. 
 
Critical Assessment     
 
As  could be seen of this brief summary of major features of the new strategy, it is to a 
large degree a continuation of the Lisbon Agenda. The good news in this respect is 
avoidance of the ’one size fits all’ approach, often plaguing  the bureaucratic 
interpretations of EU intitiatives. It is equally a plus that there is no attempt to  enhance 
centralization of funds and decision making competences, thus taking due account of 
’unity in diversity’. The continued reliance on national funding may  sound sobering for 
the new member states, but is a reflection of the  realities of the post-crisis period. It is 
equally good that  we find no equivalent of the 127 detailed targets of the original Lisbon 
Agenda, since the new objectives are functional, over-arching and  not least socially 
relevant.    
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Among the weak points it  would be hard to overlook that  environmental concerns 
continue to be relgated to a sectoral rather than a formative component. This is a problem 
insofar as this is the field where the EU may and should aspire for becoming a global 
leader, as appreciated by American authors as well/ Kelemen,2010/. Second, many of the 
quantitative targets look quite arbitrary, following political convenience than any 
academic standard. This holds for emission reduction just as much as the  target for R+D 
spending or  the objectives to limit the numbers of early school leavers. In reality even if 
40 per cent of youngsters earn a diploma this is, on its own, no entry card to improved job 
market perfomance. As we have seen, employability may in some cases require even 
earlier leaving of regular schools- for vocational training or work- that later may be 
complemented by  on the job and formal training. Likewise the quality of college and 
university output leaves a lot to be required, since  several skills- including 
enterpreneurial ones- that would directly be ov avail to help employability do not figure 
in the current curricula. Overall, the social appreciation of work as a major activity is still 
low in many countries, and lavish transfer schemes contribute to this misperception.   
 
Similarly to the Lisbon Agenda the Euro 2020 is weakest on the side of implementation. 
While we welcome the refrainment from bureaucratic, centralized command methods, 
still ruling in say the CAP and much of cohesion spending, declaring objectives without 
even hinting at means of attaining them is usually considered to be bad business practice. 
If for no other reason, because  goals and means form a unity, which in an ideal case 
scenario work in a mutually supportive manner, via a series of trials and errors, and not 
least via mutual adjustments. Leaving all means in national hands is of course  in line 
with the tenor of the day. But in the longer run these may well backfire . 
 
As noted at the very outset, a mission statement, like Euro 2020, should not be mixed up 
with an operational policy document. It is vitally important to have an idea about where 
the Community is heading to, which are the frequently invoked  European values in 
concrete terms. But  leaving all implementation in the darkness  is a danger even if  
visions return and crisis management will finally be replaced by strategic action for 
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global growth. This is the only way for the EU to avoid being relegated into a second 
rank  global player already during the current turbulent  decade.   
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